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CLERGY MALPRACTICE: THE CAUSE OF ACTION
THAT NEVER WAS
By STEVEN A. CHASE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Between 1974 and 1979 Kenneth Nally was an active member of
Grace Community Church in southern California. On numerous occa-
sions Nally sought and received counseling, guidance, and disciplining
from several of the Grace Community Church pastors. In April 1979,
Nally, who had a history of depression, took his own life with a shotgun.
On March 31, 1980, Nally's parents filed a complaint against Grace
Community Church and four of its pastors.' The complaint alleged
counts of "clergyman malpractice", 2 ordinary negligence in the reli-
gious counseling and guidance given Nally by church pastors, and outra-
geous conduct based on the content of religious counsel.3 The case,
Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley,4 became the catalyst for
dozens of "clergy malpractice" 5 lawsuits across the country. One by one,
however, these lawsuits resulted in findings of no malpractice liability for
either church or pastor.
Today, nine years after the filing of Nally, not a single plaintiff has
prevailed under the theory of clergy malpractice-not even Mr. and Mrs.
Nally.6 Three reasons for the theory's failure are: conflicts with the free
exercise clause; conflicts with the establishment clause; and the availabil-
* The author received his J.D. from Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College
in 1989. Currently, he is an associate with Cosgrave, Vergeer & Kester, in Portland, Oregon. The
author wishes to thank Cathy Chase for her support during his law school education.
1. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, No. 18668-B (L.A. County Super. Ct.,
Cal., filed Mar. 31, 1980).
2. The term "clergyman malpractice" is rumored to have been coined by someone in the in-
surance industry, possibly to generate sales of a new product-"clergyman malpractice insurance."
Beecher, Ministerial Malpractice, LIBERTY MAGAZINE, Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 15. In the Spring of
1979, Church Mutual Insurance Company began offering malpractice coverage for the clergy.
Marty, Ministerial Malpractice, 96 CHRISTIAN CENT. 511, 511 (1979).
3. Nally, No. 18668-B (L.A. County Super. Ct., Cal., filed Mar. 31, 1980).
4. 204 Cal. Rptr. 303, 304 (1984). Opinion deleted from Cal. App. 3d on direction of the
California Supreme Court by order dated August 30, 1984, 157 Cal. App. 3d 940 (1984).
5. The term "clergy malpractice" is sometimes used loosely to refer to a broad range of liabil-
ity theories that cover both intentional and negligent conduct. This paper, however, uses the term to
refer only to professional negligence by the clergy. The focus of this paper is on the application of
clergy malpractice theory in a clergy counseling context.
6. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1988).
1
Chase: Clergy Malpractice: The Cause of Action That Never Was
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1989
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
ity of alternative intentional tort theories. These three reasons support
the conclusion that clergy malpractice is the cause of action that never
was.
II. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
A. A Balancing of Interests
The free exercise clause forbids laws '.'prohibiting the free exercise" of
religion.7 The threshold inquiry for determining when the free exercise
clause applies to a counseling situation iswhether or not the counseling is
religious.8 . If the counseling that allegedly caused a plaintiff distress is a
"sincere" 9 "part of the belief. and practices" of a ."religious group,"'
then the free exercise clause is applicable.
If the free exercise clause applies, the court must apply the two-prong
balancing test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Sher-
bert v. Verner.1 Under Sherbert's first prong, the party asserting the free
exercise clause must show that the law in question poses a substantial
burden on the exercise of his or her religious beliefs or practices. 2 Free-
dom to believe is absolute, but freedom to exercise that belief is not.' 3
7. U.S. Const. amend I. The fourteenth amendment renders the free exercise clause applicable
to the states as well as to Congress. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
8. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256-57 (1982) (Old Order Amish member failed to
withhold social security taxes from his employees); see generally, Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept
in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753 (1984).
9. Although the free exercise clause forbids inquiry as to the truth or falsity of asserted reli-
gious belief, it may sometimes be proper for a court to inquire as to whether the defendant is sin-
cerely advocating a religious doctrine or falsely professing such beliefs for fraudulent purposes. J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.11, at 1087-89 (3d ed. 1986),
citing Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (the purported religion was the "I Am" move-
ment, founded by the Ballard family). See also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (the
threshold question of whether a belief was "truly held" can be resolved by the courts).
10. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (discussing religious beliefs and practices).
11. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Seventh Day Adventists fired for refusal to work on Saturdays, her
religion's day of rest). Prior to Sherbert the Supreme Court upheld regulations of religious conduct
so long as the state acted pursuant to a non-religious purpose. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145 (1879), where the Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting polygamy. The
majority indicated that Congress was free to prohibit the practice of polygamy despite its religious
implications to members of the Mormon Church. Id. at 162-67. See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905) (state law requiring compulsory vaccinations upheld despite objections on reli-
gious grounds); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state statute providing that "no mi-
nor... sell, or offer for sale, upon the street or in other public places, any newspapers, magazines,
periodicals..." was upheld despite objections by Jehovah's Witnesses that the free exercise clause
protects their right to distribute religious literature); Hill v. State, 38 Ala. App. 404, 88 So. 2d 880
(1956) (law against "snakehandling" held not unconstitutional despite relationship to a religious
practice).
12. Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398. For a discussion on the difficulty of defining "religion" and "reli-
gious beliefs" see Bowser, Delimiting Religion in the Constitution: A Classification Problem, 11 VAL.
U. L. REV. 163 (1977).
13. C antwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (Jehovah's Witness who solicited
contributions for the publication of purportedly religious literature was charged with violating anti-
solicitation statute).
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Under Sherbert's second prong, any substantial burden on religious prac-
tice will be deemed unconstitutional unless the practice poses "some sub-
stantial threat to public safety, peace or order." 4 The following two
United States Supreme Court cases illustrate the two-prong test.
In Sherbert v. Verner, Ms. Sherbert was disqualified by the South Car-
olina Employment Security Commission from receiving unemployment
compensation benefits, solely because of her refusal to accept employ-
ment in which she would be required to work on Saturdays. Sherbert, a
member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, refused to work on Satur-
days because of her religious beliefs. The Court concluded that if Sher-
bert was compelled to work on Saturdays her religious practices would
be substantially burdened. The Court also concluded that if South Caro-
lina allowed unemployment compensation to Seventh Day Adventists
who refused to work Saturdays, South Carolina's welfare system would
not be substantially threatened.' 5 Therefore, under the balancing test,
Sherbert's disqualification would result in an unconstitutional burden on
the free exercise of her religion.' 6
Nine years after Sherbert, the Supreme Court again exercised the op-
portunity to apply its two-prong balancing test. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 7
the Court invalidated Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law (re-
quiring school attendance until age 16) as applied to Old Order Amish
families. Jonas Yoder and other members of the Conservative Amish
Mennonite Church challenged the school-attendance law on grounds
that the law was at odds with their religious practice of refusing to sub-
mit their children to a secular education beyond the eighth grade.' 8 The
Court accepted Yoder's evidence as sufficient to show that the law in
question posed a substantial burden on the exercise of Yoder's religious
beliefs or practices. '9 The Court then determined that, although the state
does have an interest in universally educating all of its citizens, such an
interest would not be substantially impaired by a compulsory school ex-
emption for Amish children.2" The Court made this determination
based, in part, on evidence that nearly all Amish children continue to live
within the noncontemporary Amish community throughout their lives.2'
In sum, the law was unconstitutional as applied because one, the law
imposed a substantial burden on the exercise of religious freedom and
14. 374 U.S. at 403.
15. Id. at 403-06.
16. Id.
17. 406 U.S. 205.
18. Id. at 216. The Old Order Amish daily life and religious practices stem from their response
to their literal interpretation of the bible that they "be not conformed to this world." Id. "This
command is fundamental to the Amish faith." Id.
19. Id. at 216-19.
20. Id. at 228-29.
21. Id. at 224.
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two, the state failed to prove that the Amish religious practice at issue
posed a substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order.
In summary, applying the balancing test of Sherbert, a clergy coun-
selor who is sued for clergy malpractice can find sanctuary in the free
exercise clause if he can convince the court that his conduct was an im-
portant part of a sincere religious practice,22 that a finding of malpractice
liability will impose a substantial burden on the exercise of his religious
practices, and that such burden is not outweighed by a compelling state
interest.23
B. State Interest Increases in Proportion to the Culpability of Clergy
Counselor's Conduct
Historically, state and federal courts sitting on criminal cases have
found state interest in enforcing criminal laws to be almost always com-
pelling enough to justify imposition of a substantial burden on an individ-
ual or group's religious freedom.24 Similarly, but to a lesser extent, state
courts sitting on civil cases involving intentional tortious conduct have
found state interest compelling enough to allow an injured plaintiff a
remedy, despite the burden which is sometimes substantial on religious
22. In view of constitutional scholar Lawrence Tribe, "[a]ll that is 'arguably religious' should be
considered religious in a Free Exercise analysis...." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 14-6, at 828-29 (1978). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.6, at 1179-88
(2d ed. 1988). Numerous other commentators have criticized the mere suggestion that a court
should draw a line between religious and psychological counseling by pastors. See, e.g., Ericsson,
Clergy Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U. L. REV. 163 (1981) (Mr. Ericsson is
Special Counsel for the Center for Law and Religious Freedom of the Christian Legal Society,
Washington D.C.); Funston, Made Out of Whole Cloth? A Constitutional Analysis of the Clergy
Malpractice Concept, 19 CAL. W. L. REV. 507, 514-17 (1983) (the author considers the functions of
the minister, psychiatrist, and psychologist as overlapping and impossible to separate). For a differ-
ent view see Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9 U. SAN FERN.
VALLEY L. REV. 47, 57-59 (1981) (Bergman believes that a secular counseling function can be con-
ceptually separate from the clergyman's ecclesiastic and purely religious functions).
23. Relevant to this inquiry is the importance of the state's interest (is it a "compelling" one?)
and the extent to which the state's interest can be achieved using means that do not burden religious
practices (least restrictive means are required). J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, § 17.8, at 1073 (3d ed. 1986).
24. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (the Court upheld application of a
federal law prohibiting polygamy to a Mormon whose religion required him to engage in that prac-
tice); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (the Court upheld application of a state law
prohibiting the sale of merchandise in public places by minors to a nine year old child who was
distributing religious literature. The Court found that the state's interest in the health and well-
being of young people was compelling enough to justify the incidental burden on religion). Compare
with People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P 2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (Even if a person makes
a genuine claim that an illegal drug is central to his religious practice, a court will not grant that
person an exemption to the state's criminal laws, where use of the drug is likely to cause a person to
behave violently toward others. If, however, the drug's effects are dangerous solely to the taker, an
exemption might be made on first amendment grounds. The court granted an exemption to Ameri-
can Indians using the drug peyote for purely religious purposes). For an in depth study on a crimi-
nal prosecution of religious practices, see I. R. RUBENSTEIN, LAW ON CULTS (1981).
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freedom.25 As of this writing, however, no court has allowed a recovery
for a clergy counselor's negligent practice of his profession.26 The varia-
tion in results among the three different kinds of conduct-criminal, in-
tentional, and negligent-is explained by looking at each side of the
Sherbert balancing scale. On the state interest side of the scale, the state
interest becomes heavier as the clergy's conduct increases in culpability.
This is so because a person has the ability to recognize and change inten-
tional conduct (of moderate culpability) more easily than he can recog-
nize and change negligent conduct (of low culpability). Negligent
conduct is often too vague and uncertain to identify with precision, espe-
cially in a counseling context. Thus, the easier the conduct can be
changed to conform to society's preferred standard, the greater deterrent
effect any sanction, such as civil liability, will have. On the other hand, if
the deterrent of civil liability does turn out to be effective, the result may
very well be a "chilling" effect on the exercise of important religious
practices. The threat of civil liability for engaging in the vague concept
of negligent clergy counseling will intimidate clergy, many of whom are
uninsured against such a loss, into not exercising their first amendment
rights." This risk of chilling the free exercise of religion adds weight to
the clergy interest side of the scale. One other point worth mentioning is
that the more culpable a clergy's conduct, the less likely it is an impor-
25. See, e.g., Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W. 2d 544 (Mo. App. 1987), where plaintiff Harold Hes-
ter alleged that he, his wife and three children and been "bound together by love and affection" until
defendant, the family's pastoral counselor, intentionally and maliciously set out to alienate plaintiff
from his family's affections. Specifically, defendant was alleged to have encouraged Ms. Hester to
leave her husband in exchange for the friendship of defendant's church. As a direct and proximate
result of such tortious conduct, the couple's marriage allegedly suffered a loss of "love, care, com-
panionship, consortium and trust." Id. at 554-55. The trial court sustained the pastor's motion to
dismiss. Id. at 549.
The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal on grounds that alienation of spousal affec-
tions is disruptive not only to personal felicity but also to the family relationship. This, the court
held, is a substantial threat to public welfare and order which the law may redress, notwithstanding
the free exercise clause. Id. at 555.
26. Clergy malpractice actions rarely reach the trial stage, as defendants' insurance carriers do
not want to risk a precedent setting decision favoring liability. Burek, Clergy Malpractice: Making
Clergy Accountable to a Lower Power, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 137, 142 (1986).
27. The author is drawing an analogy from the doctrine of "overbreadth" that protects free
speech and free expression from overbroad statutes infringing on fundamental rights in a manner
that is not the least restrictive necessary to protect a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (vague ordinance prohibiting the distribution of literature of any kind,
under every sort of circulation, at any time, at any place, and in any manner, without a permit from
the city manager was held invalid on its face, as a prior restraint on free speech).
Justice Marshall put the problem of overbreadth this way: An overbroad statute "hangs over
[people's] heads like a sword of Damocles.... That this Court will ultimately vindicate [a person] if
his speech is constitutionally protected is of little consequences-for the value of a sword of Damo-
cles is that it hangs-not that it drops." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (dissenting
opinion). Marshall added that the focus of the overbreadth doctrine "is not on the individual actor
before the court but on others who may forgo protected activity rather than run afoul of the statute's
proscriptions." Id. at 229.
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tant part of a sincere religious practice,2" and even if the conduct is part
of a sincere religious practice, defendant's religious organization is not
likely to admit it.
29
In summary, the Sherbert two-prong balancing test requires a court
addressing a claim for clergy malpractice to delve into relevant spiritual,
sacramental, and doctrinal matters to determine the extent that an impo-
sition of liability will burden religious freedom.3" If the burden is sub-
stantial, the court will find the imposition of liability unconstitutional,
unless there is a state interest compelling enough to justify the burden.
When the clergy's conduct is merely negligent, a plaintiff will have an
extremely difficult task in showing that the state has a compelling interest
that justifies a substantial burden on religious freedom. Plaintiff's task is
extremely difficult because clergy counseling is a practice that is deeply
rooted and very important to most religions in this country. Imposition
of liability runs the risk that the free exercise of clergy counseling will be
chilled. Balanced against such a substantial burden on religious freedom
is a low state interest; the state interest is low because a sanction for
negligent conduct (malpractice) is likely to have more than a minor de-
terrent effect. If, however, the deterrent effect should turn out to be
great-to the point of overkill-then any chilling effect on the free exer-
cise of religion will weigh even more heavily against liability.3 '
28. Consider the following hypothetical: If a charlatan raises funds to construct a church and
then diverts the donations for personal use, the charlatan, if accused of making false representations,
will not be allowed to hide behind the free exercise clause, because such misrepresentations are
clearly not part of the charlatan's beliefs and practices. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78
(1944) (Jackson J. dissenting).
29. See, e.g., Milla v. Tamayo, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1453, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1986)(a Roman
Catholic Church that was sued on a theory of civil conspiracy denied that sexual intercourse be-
tween a counselor priest and a 16 year old parishioner and an alleged coverup by several priests and
one Archbishop furthered the religious objectives of the employer church).
30. The author accepts the position expressed by Samuel E. Ericsson that it is impossible to
draw a clean line between spiritual and psychological or psychiatric counseling by a clergy person.
As Mr. Ericsson stated the problem: "[i]t is impossible to separate the 'cure of minds' from the 'cure
of souls.'" Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U. L. REV
163, 166 (1981).
31. For other discussions on how the free exercise clause clashes with the concept of subjecting
a clergy counselor to malpractice liability, see Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications ofa
New Theory, 16 VAL. U. L. REV. 163, 176-184 (1981); Burek, Clergy Malpractice: Making Clergy
Accountable to a Lower Power, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 137, 143-45 (1986); Esbeck, Tort Claims
Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The First Amendment Considerations, 89 W. VA. L.
REV. 1, 32-34 (1986); Klee, Clergy Malpractice: Bad Newsfor the Good Samaritan or a Blessing in
Disguise?, 17 TOLEDo L. R. 209, 223-26 (1985); Funston, Made Out of Whole Cloth? A Constitu-
tional Analysis of the Clergy Malpractice Concept, CAL. W. L. REV. 507, 534-42 (1983). For an
article on the free exercise clause in general, see Pfeffer, The Supremacy ofFree Exercise 61 GEO.
L.J. 1115 (1973) (the free exercise clause is the "favored child" of the first amendment. Id. at 1142).
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III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The Question of Excessive Entanglement
The establishment clause forbids laws respecting the establishment of
religion.32 Any law that is challenged under the establishment clause
must pass a three-part test enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.33 If the law does not satisfy all of the
following conditions it is invalid as an unconstitutional violation of the
"wall of separation" between church and state:
1. The law must have a secular (nonreligious) purpose.
2. The primary effect of the law must neither advance nor inhibit
religion.
3. The operation of the law must not foster excessive entanglement of
government with religion.
34
When a court imposes a duty and establishes a standard of care in a
clergy malpractice- case, serious establishment clause problems arise.
Several commentators present valid arguments as to why the imposition
of a duty on clergy counselors violates the establishment clause.35 This
paper does not pursue that argument because there is an aspect of clergy
malpractice that is more interesting and much more vexing. The more
vexing issue arises when a court attempts to establish a standard of care
for a clergy counselor defendant. The source of the conflict is the estab-
lishment clause, and the conflict is most commonly known as excessive
church and state entanglement.
Malpractice is a specialized type of negligence that has reference to a
particular standard of care which is undertaken by a given profession or
trade.36 Problems arise when a court seeks to impose either a secular or
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The fourteenth amendment renders the free exercise clause applica-
ble to the states as well as to Congress. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
33. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (the Court held that salary supplements for parochial school teachers
was an unconstitutional entanglement between church and state). The first two prongs of the Lemon
test are explained in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Pennsylvania public
schools' daily practice of reading from the Bible at beginning of school day held to be unconstitu-
tional violation of establishment clause).
34. Id.
35. See. e.g., Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U. L.
REV. 163 (1981) (Ericsson argues that a clergyperson has moral obligations to his or her parishio-
ners that do not always rise to the level of a legal duty). See also Burek, Clergy Malpractice: Making
Clergy Accountable to a Lower Power, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 137, 148-150 (1986) ("[flor purely
pragmatic reasons it would be virtually impossible to impose a duty upon a minister, priest, or rabbi
in terms of the performance of spiritual or ministerial functions." Id. at 149). For a contrary opin-
ion, see Klee, Clergy Malpractice: Bad News for the Good Samaritan or a Blessing in Disguise? 17
TOLEDO L. R. 209 (1985) ("[t]he tort concept of clergy malpractice imposes a duty on the clergyman
to recognize his own counseling limitations and refer those cases beyond the scope of his competence
to counseling practitioners with more specialized training." Id. at 253.
36. Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The'First Amendment
Considerations, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 78 (1986). The Restatement (Second) of Torts has this to say
about the standard of care owed by- a professional: "Unless he represents that he has greater or less
7
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a denominationally specific standard of care on the clergy counselor.
Courts encounter problems for the following reasons. First, because psy-
chiatrists and psychologists receive education and training that is inten-
sively specialized, the same level of competence and professional
knowledge cannot be expected from a clergy person.3 7 Second, many
members of the clergy are knowledgeable about secular counseling mod-
els or practices but do not, because of religious beliefs, choose to follow
such models or practices. 3' Third, because of the vast diversity within
the religious community, any attempt to make a comparison of accepted
religious techniques for the purpose of identifying an acceptable standard
will fail.39 The standard of care for psychiatry, for example, can be de-
rived by comparing established therapies, noting the points of agreement
or similarity in techniques or fundamental precepts. "Where the estab-
lished schools of thought are relatively few, this might be accomplished
with relative ease. In the religious milieu of pastoral counseling,where
there are hundreds of varying theologies and doctrines, such analysis
would be practically impossible. Thus, the diversity of religious belief
systems could make it impossible to define a general standard with suffi-
cient precision to measure conduct."'4 Fourth, even if a different stan-
dard of care could be imposed for each and every sect, a different
standard within each sect would have to be imposed depending on
whether the counselor was a bishop, priest, Pope, minister, nun, or Sun-
day school teacher. These different levels of ministry may carry different
degrees of skill and learning, different functions, and different authority
within the sect.4
skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is
required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or
trade in good standing in similar communities." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A
(1965). See also discussion in Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 194 Cal. App. 3d
1147, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1987). The court of appeals held that one, nontherapist religious counsel-
ors have a duty to refer suicidal persons to those mental health professionals better authorized and
equipped to deal with suicidal persons and two, the imposition of such a duty on pastoral counselors
does not violate freedom of religion guarantees of the first amendment. On appeal to the California
Supreme Court, the court reversed and held that, first amendment issues aside, the law of California
imposes no "duty to refer" on pastoral nontherapist counselors. 47 Cal. 3d 278, 292-300, 763 P.2d
948, 956-61, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 105-10 (1988)
37. Bergman, Is The Cloth Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9 SAN FERN. V. L.
REV. 47 (1981).
38. Burek, Clergy Malpractice: Making Clergy Accountable to a Lower Power, 14 PEPPERDINE
L. REV. 137, 152 (1986).
39. Note, Religious Counseling-Parents Allowed to Pursue Suit Against Church and Clergy for
Son's Suicide, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 213, 235 (1985) (authored by M. Maureen Anders).
40. Id. In 1988, there were at least 155 separate religious bodies in the United States. Consen-
sus of Religious Groups in the US., in THE WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 1989, at 590-91
(1988). One study reports that between 1965 and 1978 nearly 1,300 new cults appeared in the
United States. Rudin, The New Religious Cults and the Jewish Community, 73 RELIG. EDUC. 350
(1978).
41. Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U. L. REV. 163,
170-71 (1981).
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Establishing a standard of care for a clergy counselor would violate the
second and third prongs of the Lemon test because the effect-clergy
liability-would inhibit a deeply significant part of religious practice, and
because judicial enforcement of a clergy counseling standard would en-
tail pervasive monitoring of a religious activity by secular authorities,
resulting in excessive church-state entanglement.4 2 One team of com-
mentators summed up the problem this way:
In order to rule on a clergy malpractice claim, a court would be required
to take 'expert' testimony, presumably from other clergymen of the same
faith, as to whether the defendant acted in conformance with church
teachings on clergy conduct. The defendants might very well counter
with their own clergymen experts to explain why their interpretation of
church teachings permits conduct of the sort in question. In addition to
the utter repugnancy of clergymen testifying against clergymen on reli-
gious matters in a court of law, a court would be required to determine
the correct interpretation of church dogma in order to determine the ap-
plicable standard of care. This is an inquiry which the First Amendment
would clearly seem to forbid.43
Although two courts have recognized the serious problems raised by
the establishment clause in clergy malpractice cases, both courts dis-
missed the cause of action on other grounds." The true effect of an es-
42. Klee, Clergy Malpractice: Bad News for the Good Samaritan or a Blessing in Disguise?, 17
TOLEDO L. REV. 209, 224 (1985). But cf Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619 (discussing continuing state
surveillance of parochial school teachers).
43. English & Dibert, Punishing the Preacher, 17 THE BRIEF 6, 10 (Summer 1988).
44. In Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W. 2d 544 (1987), plaintiffs, husband and wife, brought an
action against a Baptist minister for "ministerial malpractice." Id. at 554. Plaintiffs alleged that the
minister who counseled them about child discipline problems owned a duty of care toward plaintiffs
that arose out of the special counseling relationship. They further alleged that the minister breached
his duty when he divulged confidential communications made during counseling to other members
of the church. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the minister committed counseling malprac-
tice in that he "acted contrary to ministerial ethics and against Missouri law... and against the
standard of conduct imposed upon ministers of the gospel." Id. at 554.
The Missouri Court of Appeals identified the establishment clause issue as "whether pastoral
counseling is so ineluctably a function of the particular religion that no one definition of its malprac-
tice can evolve into a standard of professional performance, and is otherwise so purely sacerdotal a
function, that it is both unfeasible as a theory of tort and not constitutionally permissible." Id. at
553. The court then avoided deciding the first amendment issue by affirming the trial court's dismis-
sal of the malpractice claim on grounds that plaintiff failed to allege that defendant had a legal, as
distinguished from moral, duty.
In Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr.
97 (1988), the Supreme Court of California had an excellent opportunity to establish landmark pre-
cedent concerning first amendment religious issues, but instead held that the trial court correctly
granted defendants' nonsuit motion on grounds that defendants had no legal duty to prevent a sui-
cide. 47 Cal. 3d 299-300. After the court stated that the case would not be decided on constitutional
grounds, id. at 291, the majority took the liberty of discussing the constitutional question in dicta.
Even assuming that workable standards of care could be established in the present case, an
additional difficulty arises in attempting to identify with precision those to whom the duty
should apply. Because of the differing theological views espoused by the myriad of religions in
our state and practices by church members, it would certainly be impractical, and quite possibly
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tablishment clause defense may not be the dismissal of a clergy
malpractice claim on establishment clause grounds, but rather the de-
fense may work to intimidate judges into dismissing the claim instead of
confronting the vexing standard of care issue.45
IV. INTENTIONAL TORT THEORIES
A. Introduction
Sections II and III above explain why first amendment concerns have
consistently stifled attempts by plaintiffs' attorneys to develop a viable
theory of clergy malpractice in a clergy counseling context. One very
significant reason that courts are unwilling to expand tort liability in this
area46 is the availability of alternative theories of recovery; primarily in-
tentional tort theories. Granted, intentional tort theories are not always
available because of difficulties in proving requisite mental states; how-
ever, if the legal system occasionally leaves an injured plaintiff without
redress, that harm to society is easily outweighed by the advantages of
continued religious freedom, as protected by sturdy free exercise and es-
tablishment clauses.
unconstitutional, to impose a duty of care on pastoral counselors. Such a duty would necessar-
ily be intertwined with the religious philosophy of the particular denomination or ecclesiastical
teachings of the religious entity.
Id. at 299.
Because California is a tort theory leader-see, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of University of Califor-
nia, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (therapist held liable for failure to warn
third person whom patient said he would kill); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948)
(court placed the burden of proof as to causation on two defendants who both, at the same time, shot
in the direction of plaintiff. Plaintiff, struck by a single bullet, could not prove which defendant fired
the bullet that hit him.)-a decision on the constitutional merits of the case would have had a signifi-
cant impact on the viability of the theory of clergy malpractice in a counseling context.
45. In Destefano v. Gabrian, 729 P.2d 1018 (Colo. App. 1986), plaintiff-husband brought a
negligence action against a Catholic Dioceses, alleging that the diocese owed a continuing duty to
him to reasonably train, interview, and supervise parish priests who do marriage counseling. Plain-
tiff also alleged that the diocese knew or should have known that a certain priest (Gabrian) had a
history of indiscretions with vulnerable married women. Plaintiff further alleged that as a direct and
proximate result of the conduct of the defendants, the priest and plaintiff's wife entered into an
intimate relationship which contributed to the ultimate dissolution of the marriage between plaintiff
and his wife. Id. at 1019.
The Colorado Court of Appeals held that plaintiff's allegations of negligence were insufficient and
that defendant diocese's conduct was "not tortious and not actionable," No further explanation was
given by the court. Id. at 1021. The court also held that plaintiff's claims against the priest for
negligent counseling, outrageous conduct, and breach of fiduciary duty amounted to claims of aliena-
tion of affections, criminal conversion, and seduction, which were barred by Colorado's "heart balm
statute." Id. (The Colorado Supreme Court subsequently reversed in part and affirmed in part.
Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988). The subsequent decision is discussed infra in
note 49).
46. For a contrary opinion on the unwillingness of courts to expand tort liability see Basil,
Clergy Malpractice: Taking Spiritual Counseling Conflicts Beyond Intentional Tort Analysis, 19
RUTGERS L. J. 419 (1988).
47. The United States Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that plaintiffs with meri-
torious suits must sometimes go without recovery so that important first amendment rights are safe-
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Section IV below first discusses some advantages that intentional tort
theories have over the clergy malpractice theory. The section then pro-
ceeds with illustrations of how several of the more successful intentional
tort theories have been applied in specific cases involving clergy
counselors.
B. Advantages That Intentional Tort Theories Have Over The Clergy
Malpractice Theory
The intentional torts of a cleric are often actionable even though inci-
dental to religion.4" As a general rule, negligence (even when it is mal-
practice) is easier to prove than intentional tortious conduct. This
general rule does not apply, however, when the wrongful conduct is com-
mitted by a clergy counselor. In that situation, the rule is clearly the
converse. A plaintiff will have more success with intentional tort theories
than with a clergy malpractice theory for three reasons. First, the state
has a greater interest in providing an avenue of recovery for intentional
torts because the sanction-civil liability-will have a greater deterrent
effect. Second, intentional torts are more likely to be secular in nature, or
at least not as central to a sincere religious practice. If the tortious con-
duct is purely secular in nature, then the free exercise and establishment
clauses are inapplicable.49 If the tortious conduct is religious in nature,
guarded. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986) (the Court
held that plaintiff must bear the burden of showing the falsity of defendant's defamatory speech
when plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern. Id. at 777).
See also the defamation case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). ("The First
Amendment requires that we [the Court] protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that
matters." d. at 341).
48. See, e.g., Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330, 334-35, 341 A.2d 105, 107-08
(1975)(courts might have the authority to regulate areas of paramount state concern relating to
maintenance of marriage and family relationships, despite church practice of "shunning" outsiders);
Handley v. Richards, 518 So. 2d 682, 685 (Ala. 1987) ("Liability for such conduct [intentional torts
of a cleric] does not clash with the free exercise clause of the First Amendment because conduct
albeit promoted by religious belief is subject to regulation for the protection of society. That is the
clear sense of Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,... (1940) at 303..." Handley involved
a wrongful death claim arising out of a suicide, allegedly caused by a minister's malpractice or
"outrageous conduct" during counseling); Meroni v. Holly Spirit Ass'n, 125 Misc. 2d 1061, 1067,
480 N.Y.S.2d 706, 710 (1984) (allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful
death as a result of "brainwashing").
For an interesting case where a minister testified that he never held the religious beliefs at issue to
be true, see In re The Bible Speaks, 73 Bankr. 848 (D. Mass. 1987). In In re The Bible Speaks, an
heiress who donated more than six million dollars to a church was allowed to recover her donations
under the theory of undue influence. But see Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of New York,
815 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987) (the court held that Jehovah's Witnesses' practice of "shunning" for-
mer members is protected under the free exercise clause because one, the imposition of tort liability
would pose a substantial burden on the Jehovah Witnesses' religious practice and two, the practice of
shunning does not constitute a sufficient threat to the peace, safety, or morality of the community to
warrant state intervention).
49. See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988), where plaintiff-husband brought an
action against a Catholic prist and archdiocese alleging that plaintiff and his wife had consulted the
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but not a central part of the defendant's religious practice, the burden on
defendant's exercise of religion may not be substantial enough to meet
the first prong of Sherbert -the substantial burden test; if Sherber's first
prong is not met, then the insubstantial burden on religion will not be
unconstitutional. If the tortious conduct is only a marginally central
part of defendant's religious practice, then the burden may barely be
enough to meet Sherbert's first prong, but may not be enough under Sher-
bert's second prong-balancing of interests-to withstand a substantial
state interest in protecting the public safety, peace, or order. Third, a
court sitting on an intentional tort case does not have to walk on the
proverbial thin ice of the establishment clause while sifting and sorting
through religious doctrine in the hope of gleaning the appropriate stan-
dard of care to apply to a particular clergy defendant.5°
Of the intentional theories that have been asserted in actions against
clergy counselors, three theories stand out as the most successful from
the plaintiffs' perspective; these theories are alienation of affections, inva-
sion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Each the-
ory is defined and illustrated below. Other tort theories that have been
asserted in actions against clergy counselors include defamation,5' tor-
tious misrepresentation,52 and breach of a fiduciary duty.53
priest for marriage counseling, and that the priest interfered with plaintiff's marital relationship by
engaging in sexual relations with plaintiff's wife. Defendants asserted that the priest's conduct fell
within the sincere practices and beliefs of the Catholic Church, and was, therefore, protected by the
first amendment. Id. at 283. The Supreme Court of Colorado rejected defendants' first amendment
defense on grounds that "every Catholic is well aware of the vow of celibacy required of a priest at
the time of his ordination .... [S]exual activity by a priest is fundamentally antithetical to Catholic
doctrine. As such, the conduct upon which [the claim] is premised is, by definition, not an expres-
sion of a sincerely held religious belief." Id. at 284.
In a case similar to Destefano, Strock v. Presnell, 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 527 N.E.2d. 1235 (1988),
plaintiff brought suit against a Lutheran minister and his church for damages caused when the
minister allegedly engaged in an affair with plaintiff's former wife during the time plaintiff and his
former wife were seeking marriage counseling from the minister. Defendants' asserted the first
amendment free exercise clause as a shield to liability. Like the court in Destefano, the Supreme
Court of Ohio rejected the defense on grounds that "it is clear that the alleged conduct was nonreli-
gious in motivation-bizarre deviation from normal spiritual counseling practices of ministers in the
Lutheran Church." 38 Ohio St. 3d at 210, 527 N.E.2d at 1238.
50. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W. 544 (Mo. App. 1987) (plaintiff alleged that plaintiff's
former pastor and counselor delivered sermons from the pulpit wherein the pastor wrongfully stated
that plaintiff was a thief, arsonist, cheat and child abuser).
52. See, e.g., Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 57 Or. App. 203, 644 P.2d 577 (1982),
rev. denied, 293 Or. 456, 650 P.2d 928 (1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1206 (1983), cert. denied 459
U.S. 1227 (1983) (plaintiff alleged that the Church of Scientology falsely represented that the
church's communications course "would provide more knowledge of the mind than is possessed by
any psychologist or psychiatrist," that the church's "auditing program" would "increase I.Q.
scores, "cure neuroses, criminality, insanity, psychosomatic ills, homosexuality and drug depen-
dence," and that the study of the church's "dianetics" philosophy would "cure asthma, arthritis,
rheumatism, ulcers, toothaches, pneumonia, colds, and color blindness." 57 Or. App. at 228, 644
P.2d at 593-594).
53. See, e.g., Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or. App. 104, - P.2d - (1989). The court in Erick-
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C. Alienation of Affections
The gist of the tort of "alienation of affections" is an interference with
the marital relationship resulting in a change of one spouse's attitude
toward the other spouse.5 4 The tort, once recognized in all states except
Louisiana," is now actionable in only about half the states.56 One of the
main reasons for the abolition of the action is that is particularly suscep-
tible to abuse.5" The necessary elements of an action for alienation of
affections are:
(1) an existing marital relationship; (2) an intent to alienate the spouse's
affections by defendants' conduct; (3) an actual alienation of the spouse's
affection; and (4) a causal connection between defendants' conduct and
the alienation (proximate cause). With respect to the second element,
actual, direct proof of an intent to alienate is not necessary. It is suffi-
cient to prove that the natural and probable consequence of the defend-
ant's acts was to alienate the affections of the spouse.
5 8
son treated plaintiff's claim for "breach of fiduciary duty" as a claim for the breach of a confidential
relationship. 99 Or. App. at 106. Defendant Christenson characterized plaintiff's claim as a cause of
action for clerical malpractice and argued that the claims should be dismissed because such an action
requires the court to develop a community standard of care. Imposing such a standard, argued
defendant, would involve examining the validity of religious beliefs and could interfere with access to
clerical counseling-conduct by the court that violates both the free exercise and establishment
clauses of the first amendment. Id at 108. The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected defendant's char-
acterization and allowed plaintiff to bring the claim along with a second claim for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. Id.
54. KEETON, DOBBS, KEETON & OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 124, at 918-19
(5th ed. 1984). The tort of alienation of affections has been expanded in some jurisdictions to cover
the affections of one's child or parent. See Annotation, Right of a Child or Parent to Recovery for
Alienation of Other's Affection, 60 A.L.R. 3d 931 (1974).
55. KEETON, DOBBS, KEETON & OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 124, at 918 (5th
ed. 1984). (Louisiana rejected the action in Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 170, 115 So. 447 (1927).
56. The following statutes or judicial decisions abolish or severely limit actions for alienation of
affections: ALA. CODE § 6-5-331 (1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-341 (1973); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 43.5 (West 1939); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-202 (1973); CONN. GEN. ANN. § 52-572b (1982);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 3924 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-923 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 771.01 (West 1945); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-17 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-4-1 (Bums 1974);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 167 (1973); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-301 (1973);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2901 (1935); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 553.01 (West 1978); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-601 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.370 (19-_); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (West
1935); N.Y. CiV. RIGHTS LAW § 80-a (McKinney 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.29 (Page
1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 76, § 8.1 (West 1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1001 (1974); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-220 (1950); W. VA. CODE § 56-3-2a (1969); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 768.01 (1972);
WYO. STAT. § 1-23-101 (1977); Fundermann v. Michelson, 304 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1981); Wyman v.
Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 (1980); and O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 112 Idaho 472, 733 P.2d
693 (1986).
57. See Strock v. Presnell 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 213, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1240 (1988) (the court
held that actions for alienation of affections are not constitutionally protected "property interests"
and thus, statute abolishing amatory actions does not violate due process. 33 Ohio St. 3d at 214, 527
N.E.2d at 1241).
58. O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 112 Idaho 472, 475, 733 P.2d 693, 696 (1986) (citing Carrieri v.
Bush, 69 Wash. 2d 536, 419 P.2d 132, 136 (1966)). Washington has now judicially abolished the
action of alienation of affections. Wyman v. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 (1980).
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In the 1987 Missouri case of Hester v. Barnett,59 plaintiff Harold Hes-
ter alleged that he, his wife and three children had been "bound together
by love and affection" until defendant, the family's clergy counselor, in-
tentionally and maliciously set out to alienate plaintiff from his family's
affections. Specifically, defendant was alleged to have encouraged Ms.
Hester to leave her husband in exchange for the friendship of defendant's
church. As a direct and proximate result of such tortious conduct, the
couple's marriage allegedly suffered a loss of "love, care, companionship,
consortium and trust."'  The trial court sustained a motion to dismiss
by the clergy.61
On plaintiff's appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals applied the bal-
ancing test of Sherbert v. Verner 62 and concluded that alienation of
spousal affections is disruptive not only to personal felicity, but also to
the family relationship; therefore, because of the substantial threat to
public welfare and order, the law may provide redress, notwithstanding
the fee exercise clause.63
Another leading alienation of affection case is Bear v. Reformed Men-
nonite Church."4 Although the case does not arise out of a counseling
context, Bear is worth addressing because of the court's articulate appli-
cation of the constitutional principles enunciated in Sherbert.65 In Bear,
plaintiff Robert Bear had been excommunicated from defendant church
for his criticism of the teachings and practices of both the church and its
bishops.6 6 As part of the excommunication, plaintiff's wife and children
were "advised" or "encouraged" to "shun and boycott" plaintiff or suffer
shunning themselves. 67 Plaintiff further alleged that his family life col-
lapsed because his wife and children refused to speak to him or have any
physical contact with him.68
The issue on appeal to Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was whether
the free exercise clause of the first amendment was a complete defense to
the count for alienation of affections. 69 The court pointed out that the
United States Supreme Court in Sherbert recognized as constitutional a
certain degree of regulation over conduct done in furtherance of or pur-
suant to religious belief when such conduct poses "some substantial
59. 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. App. 1987).
60. Id. at 554-55.
61. Id. at 549.
62. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
63. Hester, 723 S.W.2d at 555.
64. 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105 (1975).
65. 374 U.S. 398.
66. 462 Pa. at 332, 341 A.2d at 106.
67. Id. at 332-33, 341 A.2d at 106.
68. Id. at 333, 341 A.2d at 106.
69. Id. at 334, 341 A.2d at 107.
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threat to public safety, peace or order."7 However, because this is a
highly sensitive constitutional area "[o]nly the gravest abuses, endanger-
ing paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."'" The
court went on to hold that the shunning practice of defendant church
and its individual members "may be an excessive interference within ar-
eas of 'paramount state concern,' i.e., the maintenance of marriage and
family relationships [and the] alienation of affection .. "72 The court
concluded that plaintiff "placed sufficient 'doubt' that would entitle him
to proceed with his action in order that he may attempt to prove the
requisite elements that would entitle him to relief under Sherbert."73
D. Invasion of Privacy
The general tort category of "invasion of privacy" consists of four dis-
tinct causes of action; these actions are: one, appropriation of plaintiff's
name or likeness;74 two, intrusion onto plaintiff's solitude;75 three, unrea-
sonable public disclosure of private facts about plaintiff;76 and four, plac-
ing plaintiff before the public eye in a false light.77 The third kind of
action-public disclosure of private facts-is the most relevant to a
clergy counseling situation.
Professor William Prosser was of the view that the tort of public dis-
closure of private facts had three requirements. These three require-
ments are:
(1) the disclosure of the private facts must be a public disclosure and not
a private one; (2) the facts disclosed to the public must be private facts,
and not public ones; and (3) the matter made public must be one which
would be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of
ordinary sensibilities.78
The Restatement (Second) of Torts adds a fourth requirement that the
70. Id. (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403).
71. 462 Pa. at 335, 341 A.2d at 107-108 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)).
72. 462 Pa. at 334, 341 A.2d at 108 (the emphasis here was added by the author; the court itself
emphasized the word "may" in a similar context. Id.).
73. Id. at 335, 341 A.3d at 108.
74. See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (former heavyweight cham-
pion, Muhammad Ali, sued Playgirl magazine for publishing a drawing that allegedly appropriated
Ali's likeness); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (appro-
priation of celebrity's "identity").
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1965). See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d
986 (2d Cir. 1973) (celebrity harassed by "paparazzo" photographer).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1965). See, e.g., Howard v. Des Moines Reg-
ister & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979) (defendant disclosed fact that plaintiff was invol-
untarily sterilized).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1965). See, e.g., Dean v. Guard Publishing
Co., 88 Or. App. 192, 744 P.2d 1296 (1987) (plaintiff's photograph appeared in a newspaper story on
the opening of an alcohol rehabilitation center).
78. KEETON, DOBBS, KEETON & OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 117, at 856-57
(5th ed. 1984).
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public does not have a legitimate interest in having the information
available.79
In the 1986 Idaho case of O'Neil v. Schuckardt,80 plaintiff Jerry O'Neil
brought an action for alienation of affections and invasion of privacy
against the Fatima Crusade (a fundamentalist sect of the Catholic
Church), the church's leader Bishop Schuckardt, and individual mem-
bers of the church. Plaintiff alleged that defendants convinced plaintiff's
wife that her marriage to plaintiff was not valid in the eyes of God be-
cause plaintiff was not Catholic, and that she would be committing sin if
she lived with plaintiff as husband and wife.8 ' Plaintiff further alleged
that certain defendants told plaintiff's children that their father (plaintiff)
was "not a true father or someone they could depend on," and that their
father's religion was wrong.82 Plaintiff further alleged that church offi-
cials purposefully kept his family from seeing him by using lies and
deceit.8 3
At trial, a jury rendered a one million dollar verdict in favor of plain-
tiff and his children. The award included $250,000 for alienation of
plaintiff's wife's affections and invasion of their marital privacy, $50,000
to each of the five children for invasion of their privacy, and $500,000 in
punitive damages. On defendants' motion, the trial judge granted a judg-
ment n.o.v. 
4
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the granting of the
judgment n.o.v. as to the cause of action concerning alienation of affec-
tions, and reversed as to the invasion of privacy cause of action.85 The
Court remanded for determinations as to what portions of the $250,000
verdict and $500,000 punitive damage awards were awards based on the
cause of action for invasion of privacy.86 The judgment n.o.v. as to the
cause of action for alienation of affections was affirmed because the court
decided to judicially abolish the cause of action in Idaho. 7
As to the invasion of privacy action, the court briefly addressed the
free exercise clause and concluded that the high measure of constitu-
tional protection for proselytization does have limits, and that those lim-
its were exceeded by defendant's interference with familial relationships
(an area of paramount state concern).8 8 The court hinted that defend-
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, comment d (1965).
80. 112 Idaho 472, 733 P.2d 693 (1986).
81. 112 Idaho 473-74, 733 P.2d at 695.
82. Id. at 479, 733 P.2d at 700.
83. Id. at 473-74, 733 P.2d at 695.
84. Id. at 474-75, 733 P.2d at 695-696.
85. Id. at 475, 733 P.2d at 696.
86. Id. at 480, 733 P.2d at 701.
87. Id. at 477, 733 P.2d at 698.
88. Id. at 478-79, 733 P.2d at 699-700.
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ants' conduct was not motivated by sincere religious beliefs.8 9 In other
words, the imposition of liability for invading plaintiff's privacy did not
pose a substantial burden on defendants' religious freedom.
In the 1987 Missouri case of Hester v. Barnett,9 ° which is also dis-
cussed above under the subsection on alienation of affections, plaintiff
Harold Hester had included in his complaint a count of invasion of pri-
vacy. 91 the complaint specifically alleged that:
Defendant [clergyman] has intruded upon plaintiffs' solitude and seclu-
sion by entering into plaintiffs' home under the disguise [sic] of helping
them and their family through family counselling and assistance with the
children's behavior problems when defendant's true motive was to harm
plaintiffs and for which he would not have been permitted into their
home had plaintiffs known defendant's true motive. Defendant has made
public by reporting to School Authorities, Juvenile Authorities, Law En-
forcement Authorities and the Hot Line for Child Abuse certain untrue
accusations, more specifically stated in other Courts hereof for the in-
tended purpose of disturbing the privacy of plaintiffs, subjecting them to
intrusion by investigators, social workers, psychologists and law enforce-
ment officers intruding upon their solitude and seclusion all to their dam-
age as hereafter more set forth.92
Plaintiff alleged that his complaint plead the essential elements of three
invasion of privacy torts: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon plaintiff's soli-
tude; (2) public disclosure of private facts about plaintiff; and (3) public-
ity that unreasonably places plaintiff in a false light before the public
eye.93 The court reviewed the pleadings as they applied to each invasion
of privacy tort and concluded that plaintiff did make out a proper claim
for unreasonable intrusion into his solitude, but did not make out proper
claims for either public disclosure of private facts or "false light."9 The
public disclosure of private facts and "false light" claims were improper
because where, as in Hester, the claim involves untrue statements about
the plaintiff, the proper remedy is under the theory of defamation.95 The
claim for unreasonable intrusion into plaintiff's solitude was proper
because:
Pastor Barnett gained access to the Hester home through the pretense as
counselor to assist in the correction of the children's behavior, when the
true motive was to harm the Hesters by the disclosure of the information
obtained through that guile. These allegations, taken as true, describe a
substantial interference with seclusion and of the kind decidedly offensive
89. Id. at 479, 733 P.2d at 700.
90. 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
91. Id. at 562-63.
92. Id. at 562.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 562-63.
95. Id. at 563.
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to a reasonable person.
9 6
The court addressed the free exercise clause with a single sentence.
"Count V[for invasion of privacy] pleads injury to the Hesters from a
course of intentionally tortious action by a minister, on an occasion only
pretextually religious, but actually entirely secular, and hence not offen-
sive to the free exercise clause." 97
The Hester and O'Neil decisions support the argument made at the
beginning of this section that a plaintiff will have more success with in-
tentional tort theories than with a clergy malpractice theory. In Hester
and O'Neil, the courts recognized both a compelling state interest in pro-
tecting familial relationships, and the questionable sincerity of those who
seek to intentionally tear apart family relationships in the name of reli-
gious practice. Hence, the free exercise clause was an easy hurdle for the
Hester and O'Neil courts to jump over. In addition, the Hester and
O'Neil courts were both able to allow an injured plaintiff a remedy with-
out the need to step into the entanglement quagmire of the establishment
clause. The entanglement quagmire is avoided in invasion of privacy
cases because the standard of defendant's conduct is measured against
that which would be highly offensive to "a reasonably person of ordinary
sensibilities."9 8 Under a clergy malpractice theory, the entanglement
quagmire cannot be avoided because the standard of care is either a secu-
lar professional standard or a denominationally specific standard. 99 In
either case, the court in a clergy malpractice case would be neck deep
and sinking fast in entanglement problems.
E. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
A plaintiff may recover under a theory of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress if he can show that these elements are met: one, defendant
engaged in conduct that was "so outrageous in character, and so extreme
in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be re-
garded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community";
two, at the time of defendant's conduct he intentionally or recklessly
caused plaintiff severe emotional distress; three, plaintiff suffered extreme
emotional distress; and four, defendant's conduct was a substantial factor
in causing plaintiff's extreme emotional distress."°
96. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment d (1977)).
97. Id. at 563.
98. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 and comments (1965). For the classic intentional
infliction of emotional distress case see Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q.B.D. 57 (1897). Defendant
amused himself by falsely telling a woman that her husband had been smashed up in an accident and
that she should go at once with two pillows to fetch him home. The shock to the woman's nervous
system resulted in serious and permanent physical consequences.
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The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has been claimed
in numerous cases involving alleged misconduct on the part of clergy
persons, church officers, or other church members.'0 ' Many of these
cases involve interesting and bizarre facts.'t 2 Below is a sampling.
In the 1984 New York case of Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n. 103 plaintiff,
Charles Meroni, Jr., as administrator of the estate of his late son Charles
Thomas Meroni, brought an action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and wrongful death against The Holy Spirit Association for the
Unification of World Christianity (Unification Church). Plaintiff al-
leged"° that defendant, knowing that Charles Thomas was at the time
emotionally disturbed, recruited Charles Thomas and subjected him to
"highly programmed behavioral control techniques in a controlled envi-
ronment thereby narrowing his attention and causing him to go into a
trance. He was subjected to an intensive program of heavy and pro-
tracted exercises, intense fasting from foods and beverages, a program of
chanting and related activities all intentionally designed by the Unifica-
tion Church to take control of [Charles Thomas]."' °5 Plaintiff further
alleged that as a result of defendant's intensive "brainwashing" program,
Charles Thomas suffered an emotional breakdown and, as a result, took
his own life.'0 6
The Supreme Court of Westchester County, New York, addressed and
101. For an article devoted to this topic, see Note, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by
Spiritual Counselors: Can Outrageous Conduct be "Free Exercise'? 84 MICH L. REV. 1296 (1986)
(authored by Lee W. Brooks).
102. For example, in the 1985 New Mexico case of Roney v. Siri Singh Sahib Harbhajan Singh
Yogi, 103 N.M. 89, 703 P.2d 186 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985), plaintiff, Kathy Roney, brought an action
against Siri Yogi, Siri Brotherhood, 3HO Foundation, and the 3HO Foundation of New Mexico. In
her complaint plaintiff alleged that defendant's teachings held that women were inferior to men, and
must be submissive to men. After plaintiff was indoctrinated with these teachings of "female submis-
siveness," Siri Yogi told her that plaintiff's "personal, spiritual and psychological ... problems were
centered in her ovaries, and that they therefore must be cut..." 103 N.M. at 90. Plaintiff further
alleged that defendant's psychological tactics "rendered plaintiff incapable of understanding or per-
ceiving the nature of what she was doing or its consequences, which deprived her of her free will."
Id. Plaintiff also alleged that in obedience to specific directions from Siri Yogi, she had an operation
known as laparoscopic tubal ligation. As a result of the operation, plaintiff claims she was made
irreversibly sterile. Id.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the sole ground that it was not filed under the statute of
limitations. Id. On appeal, the New Mexaco Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations
was tolled under doctrine of fraudulent concealment, and that on remand plaintiff's complaint must
be reinstated. Id. at 91.
103. 125 Misc. 2d 1061, 480 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984).
104. Charles Meroni, Jr. also brought a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress on
his own behalf. The claim was dismissed on grounds that plaintiff as a bystander of defendant's
allegedly tortious acts failed to allege that defendant's conduct created an unreasonable risk of seri-
ous bodily injury or harm to plaintiff, or that there was a contemporaneous observation of serious
physical injury or death inflicted on plaintiff's son in plaintiff's presence. 125 Misc. 2d at 1063-64,
480 N.Y.S.2d at 708.
105. 125 Misc. 2d at 1064-65, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 708-09.
106. Id. at 1062-63, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 707.
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quickly dispensed with the constitutional issue by stating in part "[t]hat
one performs a tort or commits a crime in the furtherance of a 'religious'
activity or as part of a religious belief does not confer immunity upon
such alleged wrongdoer."1°7 Religious conduct, as distinguished from
religious thought, remains subject to regulation for the protection of soci-
ety.t' Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress on behalf of decedent Charles Thomas was
denied."0 9 In the 1987 Alabama case of Handley v. Richards,"' plaintiff,
Tommy Handley, as administrator for the estate of Bobby Handley, filed
a claim against James Richards alleging that Richards, a pastoral marital
counselor, engaged in outrageous conduct which resulted in Handley's
suicide."' Handley and his wife, Brenda, had sought the counseling of
Richards, their minister, because the couple was experiencing marital
problems. Plaintiff claimed that during such period of counseling Rich-
ards became deeply involved in a sexual affair with Brenda. Plaintiff fur-
ther claimed that "the emotional toll of [his] marital tribulation
combined with the deceitful manner of the counseling by [Richards]
caused [Handley] to take his own life. . . .12
The Supreme Court of Alabama distinguished a claim for clergy mal-
practice from plaintiff's claim under the theory of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and stated that whether the theory of clergy malprac-
tice in terms of negligent counseling and spiritual advice is even justicia-
ble is an unresolved question. "' The court then recited the
constitutional maxim derived from Sherbert v. Verner. 4 that intentional
torts of a pastor are actionable "even though incident of religious prac-
tice and belief."' 1 5 Liability for [the intentional infliction of emotional
distress] does not clash with the free exercise clause of the First Amend-
ment because conduct albeit promoted by religious belief is subject to
regulation for the protection of society.""' 6 The court recognized that
the road is paved for an actionable claim against a pastoral counselor,
but then refused to take that road with plaintiff's facts. The court simply
stated that "under the facts of this case plaintiff has failed to show that
the minister was guilty of [the intentional infliction of emotional
107. Id. at 1067, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 710 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 518 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1987).
111. Id. at 683.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 684-85.
114. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
115. 518 So. 2d at 685 (quoting Bear V. Reformed Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330, 341, A.2d
105 (1975)).
116. 518 So. 2d at 685.
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distress]." 117
The Handley decision illustrates three important points: first, the the-
ory of clergy malpractice, though the subject of numerous scholarly" 8
and "nonscholarly" writings," 9 has yet to be adopted by any court in
any published opinion in any state; second, the free exercise and estab-
lishment clauses will not generally bar recovery for intentional torts;
20
and three, in a least some jurisdictions, the relatively new tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress is still disfavored.'
2'
117. Id. at 687.
118. See, e.g, Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U.L.
REV. 163 (1981); Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9 SAN
FERN. L. REV. 47 (1981); Funston, Made out of Whole Cloth? A Constitutional Analysis of the
Clergy Malpractice Concept, 19 CAL. W. L. REV. 507 (1983); Note, Religious Counseling-Parents
Allowed to Pursue Suit Against Church and Clergy for Son's Suicide, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 213 (au-
thored by M. Maureen Anders); Klee, Clergy Malpractice: Bad News for the Good Samaritan or a
Blessing in Disguise?, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 209 (1985); Note, Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress by Spiritual Counselors: Can Outrageous Conduct be "Free Exercise"?, 84 MIcH. L. REV.
1296 (1986) (authored by Lee W. Brooks); Burek, Clergy Malpractice: Making Clergy Accountable
to a Lower Power, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 137 (1986); Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches and
Ecclesiastical Officers: The First Amendment Considerations, 89 W. VA. REV. 1 (1986); Basil, Clergy
Malpractice: Taking Spiritual Counseling Conflicts Beyond Intentional Tort Analysis, 19 RUTGERS
L.J. 419 (1988).
119. See, e.g., Blodgett, Religion Liable for Counseling? A.B.A.J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 30; McMe-
namin, Clergy Malpractice, 90 CASE & COMMENT, at 3 (Sept.-Oct. 1985).
120. 518 So. at 685. For another case on intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Hester v.
Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). In the 1987 Missouri case, Hazel Hester (one of two
plaintiffs; her husband was the other) alleged the following facts: one, defendant Barnett, an or-
dained minister of the Baptist Church had invited plaintiff and her husband to meet with him in a
counseling relationship of trust and confidence, id. at 550; two, plaintiff was nervous and suffered
frequent and severe attacks of depression, id. at 560; three, defendant divulged strict confidences
obtained during counseling to members of defendant's church community, id. at 550; four, at the
time defendant divulged these confidences he was aware of plaintiff's fragile psychological condition,
id. at 560; five, defendant acted with malicious intent to cause plaintiff emotional distress, id; and six,
plaintiff was damaged as a result of defendant's conduct. Id. Although plaintiff apparently had facts
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, plaintiff's attorney failed to draft
the complaint so as to define his client's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
in a "simple, concise and direct" manner. Id. at 561-62 (the court discusses form of pleadings rules).
Hence, the claim was dismissed not for any factual deficiency or for any constitutional reason, but
because the complaint did not comport with form of pleading rules. See also Destefano v. Grabrian,
763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) (holding that plaintiff's complaint against clergyman marriage counselor
was sufficient to state a claim for outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress. Id. at 286.
Plaintiff had alleged that defendant took advantage of plaintiff's vulnerable emotional state to induce
her to engage in adultery. Id. at 279.
121. "Notwithstanding early recognition of a cause of action in assault cases, the law has been
slow to accept the interest in peace of mind as entitled to independent legal protection, even as
against intentional invasions." KEETON, DOBBS, KEETON & OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 12, at 54-55 (5th ed.1984). In his book, CLERGY MALPRACTICE (1986), R.W. McMenamin
predicts that "[a]ll religious figures and clergy personnel will be hearing more and more about the
tort of outrageous conduct." Id. at 81.
In the 1985 Oregon case of Christofferson v. Church of Scientology of Portland, 57 Or. App. 203,
644 P.2d 577 (1982), rev. denied, 293 Or. 456, 650 P.2d 928 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206
(1983), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983), plaintiff, Julie Christofferson, brought an action against
the Church of Scientology and others to recover under the tort theories of "outrageous conduct" and
fraud. Plaintiff alleged that defendants engaged in outrageous conduct by scheming to gain control
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V. CONCLUSION
Under present federal constitutional and state tort law, the theory of
clergy malpractice has been, since its conception in 1979, and will con-
tinue to be of theoretical significance only. Plaintiffs asserting the theory
of clergy malpractice will encounter acute first amendment problems be-
of her mind and force her into a life of servitude. 57 Or. App. at 205, 644 P.2d at 580. Then, when
plaintiff disassociated herself from the organization (after her parents had her "deprogramed," id. at
209) she was allegedly threatened, humiliated, and intimidated in such a manner as to "cause her
fear, anguish and mental distress." Id. at 224, 644 P.2d at 591.
The Oregon Court of Appeals (Gillette, J.) rejected plaintiff's claim and held as a matter of law
that defendant's behavior was not actionable as outrageous conduct. Id. at 227, 644 P.2d at 22. The
court summed up the judicial sentiment on outrageous conduct/emotional distress claims that still
prevails in a number of states:
"Without necessarily suggesting that is could never be so, we note that it would be a rare case
in which the bringing of a lawsuit would fit the definition of outrageous conduct. This tort has
been reserved for 'intentional acts of a flagrant character under most unusual facts and circum-
stances ... .
Id. at 224-225, 644 P.2d at 244-25, (citing Melton v. Selen, 282 Or. 731, 736, 580 P.2d 1019, 1022
(1978)).
In the famous California case of Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, plaintiffs,
whose son committed suicide, brought an action against Grace Community Church of the Valley
and several church related counselors under the theories of clergy malpractice (negligence) and in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress ("outrageous conduct"). Nally v. Grace Community
Church of the Valley, No. 18668-B (L.A. County Super. Ct., Cal, filed Mar. 31, 1980). Plaintiff's
alleged that each of the defendants (clergy counselors) engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct,
either intentionally or recklessly knowing that plaintiff's son, Kenneth Nally, had suicidal tendencies
and that defendants' conduct would increase the likelihood that Kenneth would take his own life.
Id. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendants exacerbated Kenneth's preexisting feelings of guilt,
anxiety, and depression by ridiculing, disparaging, and denigrating the Catholic faith-the faith once
embraced by Kenneth and still embraced by his parents. Id. In addition, plaintiffs alleged that
defendants, aware of Kenneth's suicidal ideation, not only failed to refer him to a psychologist or
psychiatrist, but instead discouraged him from seeing either. Id. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs'
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to estab-
lish a triable question of fact. 204 Cal. Rptr. 303, 311 (1984). The trial judge granted the defend-
ants' motion for summary judgment and made the following comment from the bench: "Religion
has nothing to do with this particular case, as I see it." Id. Plaintiffs' failure to allege facts sufficient
to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, not the first amendment, was the
primary reason for summary judgment.
The California Court of Appeals, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984) (known as Nally I), reversed sum-
mary judgement for defendants and remanded to the trial court. The California Supreme Court, by
order dated August 30, 1984, depublished Nally 1, 157 Cal. App. 3d 940 (1984) and deleted the
opinion from Cal. App. 3d.
On remand, at the close of plaintiffs' evidence, the trial court granted defendant's motion for a
nonsuit on all counts based on insufficient evidence. No. NCC18668B (L.A. County Super. Ct., Cal,
May 24, 1985). The court of appeals reversed the nonsuit. 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147, 1183-89, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 215, 237-40 (1987) (Nally II). The Supreme Court of California then granted review. - Cal.
App. 3d -, 747 P.2d 527, 243 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1988).
In the November 1988 decision, the Supreme Court of California took less than one page to re-
verse the court of appeals and order entry of the judgment of the trial court on the count for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. 47 Cal. 3d 278, 300-01, 763 P.2d 948, 961, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97,
110 (1988). The court briefly reviewed the elements of a cause of action for wrongful death based on
intentional infliction of emotional distress and concluded that the trial court properly granted a
nonsuit because plaintiffs "failed to alleged facts sufficient to show that defendant's conduct was
outrageous and a substantial factor in [Kenneth's) suicide." 47 Cal. 3d at 301, 763 P.2d at _. The
substantial factor requirement was not met. Id. at 300, 763 P.2d at _.
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cause: one, clergy counseling is almost always a central part of defend-
ant's religious practice; two, state interest in allowing liability for
negligent clergy counseling is not compelling enough to burden defend-
ant's religious practice; and three, a court steps into a church and state
entanglement quagmire when it attempts to identify and apply a profes-
sional standard of care for the clergy counselor. Aside from constitu-
tional reasons, courts are reluctant to extend malpractice law to clergy
counselors because plaintiffs who suffer harm to redressable interests can
frequently find relief under one or more of the intentional tort theories.
The most frequently employed theories in clergy counseling cases are
alienation of affections, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Although courts and legislatures have trimmed back
the availability of the alienation of affections theory, successful actions
under invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress
theories are on the rise. The latter theory covers a broad range of con-
duct and is particularly appropriate to the clergy counseling situation
where plaintiff is vulnerable and the confidant counselor knows of this
vulnerability, and is in a position to take undue advantage of the trusting
counselee. In addition to the three intentional torts mentioned above,
fraud is another theory that has been used with success in a clergy coun-
seling context. Therefore, there is a theory of clergy malpractice, but no
cause of action; clergy malpractice is the cause of action that never was.
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